Strengthen user authentication on mobile devices by using user’s touch dynamics pattern by Teh PS et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12652-019-01654-y
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Strengthen user authentication on mobile devices by using user’s 
touch dynamics pattern
Pin Shen Teh1  · Ning Zhang2 · Syh‑Yuan Tan3 · Qi Shi4 · Wee How Khoh5 · Raheel Nawaz1
Received: 11 June 2019 / Accepted: 12 December 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Mobile devices, particularly the touch screen mobile devices, are increasingly used to store and access private and sensitive 
data or services, and this has led to an increased demand for more secure and usable security services, one of which is user 
authentication. Currently, mobile device authentication services mainly use a knowledge-based method, e.g. a PIN-based 
authentication method, and, in some cases, a fingerprint-based authentication method is also supported. The knowledge-
based method is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, while the fingerprint-based method can be unreliable sometimes. To 
overcome these limitations and to make the authentication service more secure and reliable for touch screen mobile device 
users, we have investigated the use of touch dynamics biometrics as a mobile device authentication solution by designing, 
implementing and evaluating a touch dynamics authentication method. This paper describes the design, implementation, 
and evaluation of this method, the acquisition of raw touch dynamics data, the use of the raw data to obtain touch dynam-
ics features, and the training of the features to build an authentication model for user identity verification. The evaluation 
results show that by integrating the touch dynamics authentication method into the PIN-based authentication method, the 
protection levels against impersonation attacks is greatly enhanced. For example, if a PIN is compromised, the success rate 
of an impersonation attempt is drastically reduced from 100% (if only a 4-digit PIN is used) to 9.9% (if both the PIN and 
the touch dynamics are used).
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1 Introduction
Mobile devices have become a preferred gadget for users to 
access information and digital services, and stay connected. 
The increased usage and dependence on these devices also 
indicate that they increasingly process and store confidential 
and sensitive data. As more sensitive data are stored in, or 
accessible from, mobile devices, the risk and cost of losing 
these data are becoming higher. Therefore, more stringent 
security measures should be embedded into mobile devices. 
One of these measures is user authentication.
User authentication is the first line of defence in any 
computing system (platform or device). In a mobile 
device context, authentication is mostly achieved via a 
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knowledge-based authentication method, and, in some 
cases, a fingerprint-based authentication method is also 
supported. With the knowledge-based authentication 
method, a user proves their identity by demonstrating the 
knowledge of a secret. The use of these secrets is vulner-
able to certain security attacks such as smudge (Aviv et al. 
2010), shoulder spoofing (Zakaria et al. 2011), and brute 
force (Owusu et al. 2012) attacks. The fingerprint-based 
authentication method is sometimes unreliable. For exam-
ple, a sweaty, or dry, finger often leads to a false negative 
authentication result (Park et al. 2011). Therefore, how to 
make the authentication service secure and reliable in the 
presence of these threats and attacks for mobile users is a 
pressing task.
One of the possible measures to strengthen the security 
and reliability of the authentication service is to integrate 
a biometrics-based (e.g. touch dynamics) authentication 
method with a knowledge-based (e.g. PIN) authentica-
tion method to form a so-called two-factor authentication 
method. Touch dynamics refer to the digital signatures gen-
erated when a human interacts with a mobile device.
A touch dynamics authentication method can be imple-
mented by employing sensors already available in most 
mobile phones, digital tablets, and other touch screen 
devices, making the implementation comparatively cheaper 
than other biometrics-based authentication methods, such as 
fingerprint and iris where specialised hardware is required. 
In addition, the acquisition of touch dynamics features is less 
sensitive to external factors such as lighting conditions and 
background noise levels, making it more usable and reliable 
in a mobile context. Also, touch dynamics features can be 
acquired whenever a user uses his/her devices, for example, 
during their normal (i.e. non-authentication related) input 
activities, requiring little extra interactions by the user. For 
these reasons, a touch dynamics authentication method is 
cheaper, more usable and reliable, and may be more accepta-
ble to the general public than other biometrics-based authen-
tication methods.
To investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of using 
touch dynamics biometrics as a mobile device authentication 
solution, we have designed and evaluated a touch dynamics 
authentication method. This paper reports our work in this 
regard. More specifically, it describes how a touch dynam-
ics dataset is acquired, the way raw touch dynamics data are 
extracted from the dataset, what features and how they are 
extracted from the raw data. It also explains how we system-
atically analyse these features to select a subset of optimal 
features. It then describes the classification of the features 
to build authentication model, and the use of the model to 
authenticate a user. The paper also describes the experi-
ments carried out to evaluate the performance of the touch 
dynamics authentication method and discusses the evalua-
tion results obtained with different parameter value settings.
In detail, the structure of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next section discusses the related work. Section 3 
describes a system architecture for our proposed touch 
dynamics authentication method. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7, 
respectively, focuses on the designs and operations of core 
functional units of the architecture, i.e. the Raw Data Acqui-
sition unit (Sect. 4), Feature Construction unit (Sect. 5), 
Model Training unit (Sect. 6), and Authentication Decision-
Making unit (Sect. 7). Section 8 describes the performance 
evaluation methodology used. Section 9 analyses and dis-
cusses the evaluation results. Finally, Sect. 10 concludes the 
paper and outlines our future work.
2  Related work
This section critically analyses related work on touch 
dynamics. Depending on the input strings types used, the 
related work can broadly be classified into three groups: 
(i) work on numerical-based input strings, (ii) work on 
character-based input strings, and (iii) work on non-string 
inputs. As the scope of our work is in touch dynamics using 
numerical-based input strings, our literature critical analysis 
here will focus on (i). For details on related work in other 
groups, readers are referred to a recent literature survey of 
touch dynamics (Teh et al. 2016a). The work most relevant 
to ours has largely been focusing on studying the applicabil-
ity of, or improving the performance in, using touch dynam-
ics as a means of verifying subjects. We here discuss the 
most notable ones.
The work reported in (Vazquez et al. 2014) was carried 
out to test the applicability of verifying subjects based on 
touch dynamics using numerical-based input strings. In 
their experiments, some of the touch dynamics features 
were extracted by using the more sophisticated accelerom-
eter and gyroscope sensors. By using an Euclidean Distance 
classifier, they obtained an accuracy performance of 20% 
equal error rate (EER) on a 4-digit PIN. Using more sophis-
ticated sensors to extract some of the features means that 
this method is energy-consuming. For example, it consumes 
additional energy to obtain readings from an accelerometer 
sensor (Wang et al. 2017). In addition, relying on the use 
of these sensors also means that the method can only be 
deployed on mobile devices that are equipped with these 
sensors, limiting the scale of its deployment. This is also 
the case for the work reported in (Krombholz et al. 2016).
The authors in (Sen and Muralidharan 2014) also inves-
tigated the accuracy performance of touch dynamics using 
a 4-digit PIN. In their investigation, they recruited ten sub-
jects. Each subject was asked to provide 100 input samples 
of a predefined PIN (“1593”). They used the Multi-Layer 
Perceptron classifier to classify the legitimate subjects, and 
these subjects can be correctly classified up to 86% of the 
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time. The result is encouraging, but to achieve the reported 
level of accuracy performance, they have made use of 100 
input samples per subject to train the classifier. Acquiring 
such a large number of samples from the subjects is time-
consuming and not always practical during an enrolment 
phase. It is not clear if the same level of accuracy perfor-
mance could still be achieved when a smaller number of 
input samples are used. A similar case can be said for the 
work reported in papers (Coakley et al. 2016; Roh et al. 
2016; Shen et al. 2016).
The paper (Tasia et al. 2014) reported an experiment 
carried out on a small number of input samples than those 
described above. Input PINs ranging from 4 to 8 digits in 
length were used. By using a simple statistical classifier, the 
authors were able to achieve an EER of 8.4%. The experi-
ment was carried out on 100 subjects, more than many of the 
experiments reported in literature. For example, the experi-
ments reported in papers (Amin et al. 2015; Buriro et al. 
2015; Lee et al. 2016; Li et al. 2015; Praher and Sonntag 
2016; Roh et al. 2016; Sen and Muralidharan 2014), were 
carried out on 15 or fewer subjects. Carrying out an experi-
ment on a larger number of subjects allows us to draw more 
conclusive conclusions.
Zheng et al. (2014) conducted their experiments using 
4-digit and 8-digit PINs. The authors employed a statistical 
classifier and obtained EER values of 3.65%, 6.96%, and 
7.34% using three different 4-digit PIN numbers, “3244”, 
“1111”, and “5555”, respectively. These results show that 
when a higher repetition of digits is used, the accuracy per-
formance is reduced. They also compared the accuracy per-
formances of two different 8-digit PINs (i.e. “12597384” 
and “12598416”). Surprisingly, for one of the 8-digit PIN 
(“12598416”), the EER value was 4.45%, marginally worse 
than the 4-digit PIN (“3244”). This finding is in contrary 
to previous studies (Chang et al. 2015; Praher and Sonntag 
2016; Shen et al. 2016) which have suggested that longer 
input strings produce a better accuracy performance.
The work reported in (Chang et al. 2015) was somewhat 
unique. The authors proposed a method to allow subjects 
to change their PINs without rebuilding the authentication 
model. The subjects were asked to input ten different ran-
domly selected 10-digit PINs. Based on the samples col-
lected, they produced a table of all possible feature values 
for each digit. Using this method, they were able to achieve 
EER values of 23%, 21%, and 18% on three different PINs 
with the string lengths of 6, 8, and 10, respectively. How-
ever, the majority of the subjects taking part in this experi-
ment were at the age of 17–20, it is not clear whether the 
experimental findings apply to other age groups.
The paper (Teh et al. 2016b) reported an experiment 
carried out to collect a touch dynamics dataset from 
a group of subjects with a wider age range than those 
described above. In their experiments, five timing feature 
and a spatial feature were extracted from the input samples 
of the dataset, and, for each extracted feature, a reference 
template is created. The authors applied three statistical 
methods, i.e. Gaussian Estimation, Z-Score and Standard 
Deviation Drift, to compare the likeliness of a test sample 
against a reference template. By using these three meth-
ods, they were able to achieve EER values of 8.55%, 9.30% 
and 8.92%, respectively, on a 4-digit PIN. These statisti-
cal methods were selected based on the notion that they 
are computationally less costly than the other machine 
learning methods, so the resulting authentication system 
could incurs less computational overhead, consumes less 
power and introduces less authentication delay. It would 
be interesting to investigate and compare the efficiency 
between different methods not only in terms of accuracy 
performance, but also the training and testing time they 
incur such as those investigated in our work.
Trojahn et al. (2013) reported an experiment carried out 
to investigate the accuracy performances of timing features 
extracted using different feature length values (i.e. 1-graph, 
2-graph, and 3-graph) on a 17-digit PIN. The experimental 
results suggested that 1-graph achieves the best accuracy 
performance. A similar observation has also been reported in 
papers (Tasia et al. 2014; Zheng et al. 2014; Jain et al. 2014; 
Coakley et al. 2015). It would be interesting to investigate 
the accuracy performances of timing features extracted using 
larger feature lengths such as those investigated in our work.
More recently, Shen et al. (2016) investigated the accu-
racy performance of touch dynamics on 4-digit, 5-digit, 
and 6-digit PINs across different operational scenarios. 
Unlike other related work, they used only motion features 
extracted from accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. The 
authors pointed out that the raw data recorded by these sen-
sors could not be used directly as features to build authen-
tication models. To make the raw data useable as features, 
they computed a set of statistical metrics (min, max, mean, 
variance, etc.) from the raw data, and used the computed 
metrics as motion features. A similar method has also been 
used in other experiments such as (Buriro et al. 2015; Ho 
2013; Zheng et al. 2014). By far, this method has only been 
used to extract motion features. It would be interesting to see 
how well this method works when used to extract other types 
of features, such as timing and spatial features investigated 
in our work. To investigate the effects of operational sce-
narios on accuracy performance, they designed three types 
of scenarios (i.e. hand-hold, table-hold, and walk-hold) for 
collecting subjects touch dynamics data. The results show 
that the hand-hold scenario achieves the best accuracy per-
formance. A similar observation has also been reported in 
(Lee et al. 2016; Roh et al. 2016). Also, the results of these 
three pieces of work consistently show that the table-hold 
scenario achieves the lowest accuracy performance. This 
means that the features extracted from accelerometer and 
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gyroscope sensors may not be effective for user authentica-
tion purposes.
By far, the best accuracy performance was reported by 
(Wu and Chen 2015). The authors achieved an EER value 
of 0.56%. In this work, a two-class classification approach 
is used in building the authentication model, i.e. to build 
the model, samples from both legitimate and illegitimate 
subjects are used. This is also the case for the work reported 
in papers (Buriro et al. 2017; Ho 2013; Wu and Chen 2015). 
However, in real-life, as mobile devices are very much per-
sonal devices, illegitimate subject samples may not always 
be available. Therefore, this approach is less practical.
Table 1 summarises the related work discussed above and 
compares the related work against our work presented in 
this paper. This paper, in comparison with the related work 
discussed above, has presented a more systematic and com-
prehensive study of using touch dynamics biometric features 
for user authentication purposes. More specifically,
1. It proposes a touch dynamics authentication method, 
describing the design of a system architecture and its 
architectural units.
2. It gives a comprehensive description of the experiment 
carried out to acquire a touch dynamics dataset. Our 
experiment involves more subjects, acquires less number 
of samples per subject, and uses a device with a larger 
screen size than many other studies. The acquired data-
set is made publically available, and unlike other public 
datasets (Antal and Nemes 2016; El-Abed et al. 2014), 
this dataset uses numerical-based input strings.
3. It discusses the extraction of not only a basic set of tim-
ing and spatial related features (FOF) from the dataset, 
but also an extended set of features (SOF) from the FOF 
features (related work has mainly focused on the extrac-
tion SOF from motion related features, rather than tim-
ing and spatial related features).
4. It investigates extensively how to make the most efficient 
use of touch dynamics biometrics in authenticating a 
user, in terms of optimising accuracy and efficiency per-
formances. This includes the investigation and selection 
of a subset of optimal features, comparative studies of 
different timing feature lengths and different groups of 
classifier [one-class classifier (OCC) versus two-class 
classifier (TCC)], and the evaluation of the impacts of 
different parameter value settings on the performances.
3  Authentication system design
This section presents the threat model, deployment and 
working modes, and system architecture for the proposed 
touch dynamics authentication method.
Table 1  A summary of existing related works
a Accuracy; bFAR; cFRR
Studies Subject sizes Input lengths Sample sizes Classifier groups Device 
screen sizes
EERs (%)
(Sen and Muralidharan 2014) 10 4 100 TCC 3.7” 15.2
(Attaullah Buriro et al. 2015) 12 4 30 TCC 4.95” 97a
(Lee et al. 2016) 12 6 ~117 TCC 5” 91.2a
(Wu and Chen 2015) 20 8 50 TCC – 0.56
(Shen et al. 2016) 48 5 100 OCC 4.3” 9.74b, 11.09c
5.5” 5.01b, 6.85c
6” 4.53b, 5.89c
(Zheng et al. 2014) 53 4 20 OCC 4.65” 3.65
25 8 4.45
(Vazquez et al. 2014) 80 4,8 ≥25 OCC – 20
(A. Buriro et al. 2017) 95 8 30 TCC – 0.01b,  4c
(Tasia et al. 2014) 100 4–8 10 OCC 3.7” 8.4
(T.-Y. Chang et al. 2015) 100 6 5 OCC 3.7” 23
8 21
10 18
(Trojahn et al. 2013) 152 17 10 OCC 4.65” 4.19b, 4.59c
This Study 150 4 10 OCC 10.1” 9.9
16 7.1
4 TCC 8.7
16 5.3
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3.1  Threat model used
The threat model we use considers an attack scenario where 
an attacker or impersonator tries to gain access to a user’s 
mobile device in an unauthorised manner. We make three 
assumptions in this scenario. First, the impersonator has 
physical access to the device. Second, the device is locked 
by a knowledge-based authentication method (e.g. a PIN). 
Third, the PIN is known to the impersonator. These assump-
tions are commonly made in biometrics related authentica-
tion evaluations (Stanciu et al. 2016). In this attack scenario, 
a knowledge-based authentication method will be compro-
mised, and the impersonator will have unrestricted access 
to the mobile device.
Given this threat model, we demonstrate that, by inte-
grating touch dynamics biometrics with a knowledge-based 
authentication method forming a so-called two-factor 
authentication solution, it is a lot harder to successfully 
bypass the authentication control, as, in this case, the 
impersonator would have to correctly input the pass code 
as well as to correctly reproduce the owner’s touch dynam-
ics biometrics. It should also be pointed out that we mainly 
consider authentication in the form of verification mode (i.e. 
to verify a claimed identity) instead of identification mode 
(i.e. to classify an unknown identity), as, in real life, mobile 
devices are rarely shared among multiple individuals, and 
most of the real-life application scenarios are in the verifica-
tion mode.
3.2  Deployment and working modes
A touch dynamics authentication method can be deployed in 
one of the two modes, an identification mode and a verifica-
tion mode. These modes function uniquely and serve differ-
ent purposes and usage scenarios. The purpose served by 
the identification mode is to recognise or identify unknown 
identity. This mode is normally deployed for intrusion detec-
tions and forensic investigations. The purpose served by the 
verification mode, on the other hand, is to prove or verify 
a claimed identity. The authentication of a mobile user or a 
mobile device fits into this mode. Also, in real life, mobile 
devices are rarely shared among multiple individuals, and 
most of the real-life application scenarios are in the verifica-
tion mode. For these reasons, we mainly consider authenti-
cation in the form of verification mode.
The verification mode can operate in two working modes, 
a static mode and a dynamic mode. In the static mode, a user 
is verified at the first instance of a user-to-system interaction. 
In the dynamic mode, a user may be verified at any instant 
of a user-to-system interaction or for every service access 
(i.e. continuously) throughout a service access session (in 
addition to the initial verification). The functions performed 
in both modes are complimentary. In other words, they can 
be deployed alongside each other to enhance the security 
of mobile devices or the security of service access using 
mobile devices. Our experiments are conducted under the 
assumption that the static working mode of the verification 
mode is used.
3.3  The architecture and its functional units
Figure 1 gives the system architecture for our touch dynam-
ics authentication method. From the figure, it can be seen 
that the system architecture consists of six functional units, 
which run on a user’s mobile device. The App Interface 
unit provides an input facility for users to input their touch 
dynamics data. The Data Storage unit (DSU) is a database 
used to store authentication model. The rest four units pro-
vide the core functions required to implement the touch 
dynamics authentication system.
The operation of a touch dynamics authentication sys-
tem can broadly be captured in two phases, the enrolment 
phase and the verification phase. In the enrolment phase, 
the raw touch dynamics data of a subject (i.e. the owner of 
a mobile device) are acquired, processed, and transformed 
into an authentication model that is stored in the DSU. In 
the verification phase, the touch dynamics data of a test sub-
ject (i.e. a claimant) is compared against the authentication 
model retrieved from DSU to verify if the claimant is indeed 
whom he/she claims to be (i.e. the mobile device owner). 
Figure 1 indicates the two operational phases along with 
the units involved. In the next four sections, we describe the 
designs of the four core units and discuss the issues involved 
in more detail.
4  Raw data acquisition unit (RDAU)
RDAU is the first core functional unit of the proposed system 
architecture, responsible for extracting raw touch dynamics 
data from the subject’s input samples. This section describes 
the design of this unit, giving detailed discussions with 
regard to how the raw data acquisition experiment is setup 
(Sect. 4.1), how the input samples are acquired (Sect. 4.2), 
how raw touch dynamics data are extracted from the input 
samples (Sect. 4.3), and how the raw data are processed into 
a proper format for further analysis (Sect. 4.4).
4.1  Experiment setup
The setup of an experiment carried out to acquire a touch 
dynamics dataset concerns a number of issues, namely, 
defining a data acquisition procedure, determining a physical 
environment, recruiting subjects, selecting a data acquisition 
device, and selecting input strings.
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4.1.1  Defining a data acquisition procedure
To ensure that a subject’s touch dynamics data are prop-
erly captured, a proper data acquisition procedure should 
be used. To design a proper data acquisition procedure, two 
issues should be considered.
The first issue is how to ensure data are acquired after a 
subject is in a stable state (i.e. after he/she is familiar, and 
comfortable, with the data acquisition procedure, device, 
and app). To address this issue, we have added a familiari-
sation time at the start of a data acquisition session. During 
this time, subjects were asked to familiarise themselves with 
the data acquisition procedure, device, and app. After the 
familiarisation time, the subjects were requested to com-
plete two rounds of data acquisition, one using a 4-digit 
PIN and the other using a 16-digit PIN. In each round, the 
Data Acquisition App displays the required input PIN, and 
the subjects are asked to input the PIN. All subjects were 
required to repeat each PIN ten times.
The second issue is how to best capture intra-session 
variations for each subject. According to (Buschek et al. 
2015), if all the samples from a subject are acquired in a 
single session, intra-session variations in the touch dynam-
ics patterns of the subject may not be properly captured. 
To overcome this limitation, some authors (El-Abed et al. 
2014; Tasia et al. 2014) suggest to break a single data acqui-
sition session into multiple sub-sessions that are separated 
by some intervals, and then to combine the data acquired in 
the sub-sessions into a single set. However, this may means 
that the subject participation rate will be lower (De Luca 
et al. 2012). As a result, the sample size of the dataset may 
be reduced. To balance these considerations, i.e. to achieve 
a higher subject participation rate, while, at the same time, 
to better capture intra-session variations of the subjects, 
we have chosen to acquire data in a single session, but to 
add a familiarisation time to each subject’s data acquisition 
session.
4.1.2  Determining a physical environment
To balance between preserving data quality and better 
capturing the subjects’ touch dynamics patterns, we have 
established a semi-controlled data acquisition environment. 
We let subjects to choose their preferred locations where 
their touch dynamics data were acquired. The locations 
used included offices, homes, classrooms, inside vehicles, 
and public areas. To prevent inconsistent inputs or outliers 
mid-way into the data acquisition task, subjects were told 
to perform the required task continuously without breaks, 
avoid distractions, and stay focused while performing the 
task. To avoid distracting the subjects and to allow them 
to perform the data acquisition task naturally, we left the 
subjects alone when they are performing the task and moni-
tor them from a safe distance. Also, to prevent subjects 
from deliberately altering the way they interacted with their 
devices and to capture their touch dynamics patterns in a 
Fig. 1  The touch dynamics authentication system architecture
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more natural manner, we explained the purpose of the study 
to the subjects only after they have completed the entire data 
acquisition session.
4.1.3  Recruiting subjects
In our experiments, 150 subjects were recruited. With 
regard to subject selections, three criteria are usually used, 
age, affiliation, and profession. Subjects from different age 
groups, affiliations, and professions may use their devices at 
different frequencies and/or have different levels of device 
familiarity. If subjects are not properly selected, the data 
acquired from the subjects may introduce unintended bias 
into experimental results, leading to inaccurate study results. 
To ensure study results are as unbiased as possible, and can 
be generalised to a wider population as much as possible, the 
subjects recruited in our experiments were from different age 
groups [< 20 (19%); 20–40 (44%); > 40 (37%)], had different 
device usage frequencies [rare (33%); average (21%); often 
(46%)], and were people from the general public working in 
different professions.
4.1.4  Selecting data acquisition devices
The device used in our experiments is a Samsung Galaxy 
Tab with a 10.1-inch screen, a 1 GHz dual-core processor, 
a 1-GB RAM, and it operates on Android 4.0.4. The device 
has a larger screen size than an average mobile phone and 
phablet (a hybrid of both a phone and tablet with a screen 
size between 5 and 7 inches (Pham et al. 2017). The decision 
for using a device with a large screen size is based on the 
following observations. Firstly, the average size of mobile 
devices in the market is getting bigger year after year (Ben 
Taylor 2014). Secondly, a majority of the devices used in 
literature have a screen size of approximately 5-inch or less 
(Aviv et al. 2012; Buschek et al. 2015; Coakley et al. 2016; 
Trojahn et al. 2013; Zheng et al. 2014). Thirdly, a subject’s 
touch dynamics pattern may vary with different device sizes. 
This variation may be exploited to achieve a better accuracy 
performance.
4.1.5  Selecting input strings
What input strings should be used (and their lengths) is an 
important variable one should consider in the design of a 
data acquisition experiment. The PIN-based authentication 
method has so far been the most widely used authentication 
method for mobile devices (Aviv et al. 2017), so we have 
chosen this method as one of the two authentication meth-
ods to form our two-factor authentication method. We have 
selected two PIN inputs with different lengths. The first is a 
4-digit PIN “5560” (hereafter referred to as 4D). This input 
string length is chosen to represent a PIN commonly used 
to unlock a mobile device or a debit/credit card. The second 
is a 16-digit PIN “1379666624680852” (hereafter referred 
to as 16D). This input string length is chosen to resemble 
a debit/credit card number commonly used when making a 
card-based online payment.
4.1.6  Our dataset
The entire dataset we have acquired consists of 3000 sam-
ples and 33,000 touch actions from 150 subjects. Each sub-
ject contributed a total of 20 samples (10 for the 4D string 
and 10 for the 16D string) from 220 touch actions (50 for the 
4D string and 170 for the 16D string). The dataset is avail-
able to download at https ://goo.gl/sNACU 8.
4.2  Raw data sensing
Raw data sensing is the first process in RDAU. This is a 
process that obtains a subject’s raw touch dynamics data 
during subject-to-device interactions. Raw touch dynamics 
data are normally acquired using specially developed App. 
The App was developed using Java and Android Application 
Programming Interface (API) Level 15. During a data acqui-
sition session, the App prompts the subject to input a PIN 
by displaying a numeric keypad interface in a full-screen 
mode. For each key input of the PIN, four data values: (1) 
the key value; (2) the touch action type (i.e. finger pressing 
down on or releasing up from the key); (3) the touch action 
timestamp; and (4) the touch action pressure size.
Each touch action can be associated with a timestamp. 
The timestamp value represents the time when the action is 
taking place. A timestamp is recorded using the nanoTime() 
API function (Android Developers 2017a). It returns a time 
value with the highest timing precision (up to nanoseconds 
precision) that is available on the device. The pressure size 
can also be captured when a touch action is performed. The 
touch pressure size value represents the approximated size 
of the screen area being touched during a touch action. It is 
recorded using the getSize() API function (Android Devel-
opers 2017b), which returns a decimal value between 0 and 
1.
4.3  Raw data extraction
Once input samples are acquired from each subject, raw 
touch dynamics data should be extracted from the samples. 
Each sample consists of m number of keys, and each key, 
ki, i ∈ {1, 2,… ,m} , contains two touch actions: (i) the finger 
pressing down on the key, referred to as touch action press 
(TAP); and (ii) the finger releasing from the key, referred to 
as touch action release (TAR). The raw data are associated 
to these two actions, i.e. a timestamp, p , and a pressure size, 
ps , are recorded on each TAP action, and a timestamp, r , is 
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recorded on each TAR action. Figure 2 illustrates the raw 
data along with their respective touch actions.
4.4  Raw data processing
Once the raw touch dynamics data are obtained, the data 
should be processed into a format that is suitable for analysis 
and for subject verification. As discussed in Sect. 4.2, one of 
the raw data, the touch action timestamp, has a time value 
up to nanoseconds precision. This precision might be too 
high to properly capture a subject’s touch action speed, as a 
human’s touch action speed is usually at a slower pace than 
this order. If the timestamps are not set to an appropriate 
precision, the accuracy performance of the timing features, 
which are extracted from the timestamps, may be affected. 
So, it is important to choose an appropriate precision for the 
timestamps before extracting the timing features from them. 
Choosing an appropriate precision is done by using a scaling 
factor, 훼 , i.e. a default timestamp, t  , can be scaled by 훼 to 
produce a scaled timestamp, t̂  , with the chosen precision, 
and this can be done by using the equation, t̂ = t × e−훼.
5  Feature Construction Unit (FCU)
FCU is responsible for extracting a subject’s touch dynam-
ics features from the subject’s raw touch dynamics data. 
This section describes the design of this unit, giving 
detailed discussions with regard to the types of features that 
are extracted from the raw data and how the features are 
extracted (Sect. 5.1), the normalisation of the extracted fea-
tures to the same value range (Sect. 5.2), and the selection 
of a subset of optimal features from the extracted features 
(Sect. 5.2).
5.1  Feature extraction
In our design, two categories of features are extracted, first-
order features (FOF) and second-order features (SOF). FOF 
features are a basic set of features extracted directly from the 
raw touch dynamics data, and SOF features are an extended 
set of features extracted from FOF features.
5.1.1  First‑order features (FOF)
This section describes the process of extracting FOF features 
from a subject’s raw touch dynamics data and constructing 
a cumulative FOF feature vector for the subject. For each 
subject, a number of FOF features are captured, one spatial 
feature and multiple timing features.
The pressure size (PS) is a spatial feature capturing the 
approximated size of the screen area being touched during 
a TAP. Each TAP is associated with a PS. A timing feature 
is an attribute capturing a time interval between two touch 
actions of one or more keys. Depending on how the intervals 
are measured, there are three types of timing features, i.e. 
dwell time (DT), flight time (FT), and input time (IT), and 
for FT, there are further four variants, i.e. FT1, FT2, FT3, 
and FT4. Timing features are extracted from timestamps. 
The descriptions of these timing features and the mathemati-
cal methods used to extract them from the respective times-
tamps are given in Table 2. The variable n in the equations 
refers to the timing feature length (to be discussed below) 
used to extract timing features and m refers to the number of 
keys in the input string.
A timing feature can be extracted at different feature 
lengths. A feature length is measured in terms of the number 
of graphs, i.e. the number of keys involved in each meas-
urement. It is represented in the form of n-graphs, where n 
denotes the number of graphs. Figure 3 shows the different 
feature lengths for a given input string. The shortest feature 
length is 1-graph (or uni-graph), and the subsequent feature Fig. 2  Touch actions and their associated raw touch dynamics data
Table 2  The descriptions and 
definitions of timing features Features Descriptions Equations
DT The interval between the TAP and TAR of a key dti = ri − pi
FT1 The interval between the TAR of a key and the TAP of the next key ft1i = pi+(n−1) − ri
FT2 The interval between the TAR of a key and the TAR of the next key ft2i = ri+(n−1) − ri
FT3 The interval between the TAP of a key and the TAP of the next key ft3i = pi+(n−1) − pi
FT4 The interval between the TAP of a key and the TAR of the next key ft4i = ri+(n−1) − pi
IT The interval between the TAP of the first key and the TAR of the last key it = rm − p1
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lengths are 2-graph (or di-graph), 3-graph (or tri-graph), and 
so on. With 1-graph, the only timing feature that can be 
extracted is DT. With a larger feature length, for example, 
when n ≥ 2 , the timing feature from two or more keys can 
be extracted, i.e. FT and IT. With regard to the feature length 
selection, in most of the experiments reported in literature, 
a feature length value of 2 is usually used (Trojahn et al. 
2013). In our experiment, we have carried out a number of 
studies. In our study carried out to examine the effects of 
feature lengths on the accuracy performance of FT features, 
we have used different feature lengths. In our other studies, 
we mostly use a feature length value of 2.
Once FOF features, fi, i ∈ {1, 2,… , d} , are extracted 
from the raw data, they should be organised into the form 
of an FOF feature vector, i.e. vT
FOF
=
[
f1, f2,… , fd
]
 , where T  
indicates a particular type of FOF feature and d refers to the 
feature dimension of vT
FOF
 . When all the feature vectors are 
formed for a subject, a cumulative FOF feature vector, VFOF , 
can be generated. This is done by concatenating the FOF 
feature vectors, i.e. VFOF =
[
vDT
FOF
, vFT1
FOF
,… , vPS
FOF
]
.
5.1.2  Second‑order features (SOF)
Some classification algorithms (or classifiers) perform bet-
ter with a larger number of features (Ho 1998), so increas-
ing the number of features used in training the classifier to 
generate an authentication model can improve the accuracy 
performance of the model. For this reason, we extract a 
new category of features, known as the second-order fea-
tures (SOF), from FOF features, and use both of them in 
the training of authentication model. As discussed above, 
FOF features extracted from the raw touch dynamics data 
are organised into FOF feature vectors. For each of these 
vectors, a set of SOF features is extracted. The set consists 
of 19 features, and each feature represents a descriptive sta-
tistics metric of the FOF feature vector concerned. Descrip-
tive statistics metrics are used to quantitatively summarise 
or describe a collection of data in a meaningful way (Prem 
2016). The list of descriptive statistics metrics used in our 
experiment (with their corresponding feature identifiers in 
brackets) are: Minimum (mn), Maximum (mx), Arithmetic 
Mean (am), Quadratic Mean (qm), Harmonic Mean (hm), 
Geometric Mean (gm), Median (md), Range (rg), Variance 
(vr), Standard Deviation (sd), Skewness (sk), Kurtosis (ku), 
First Quartile (fq), Third Quartile (tq), Interquartile Range 
(ir), Mean Absolute Deviation (ma), Median Absolute Devi-
ation (mi), Coefficient of Variation (cv), and Standard Error 
of Mean (se).
Similar to the case for FOF features, SOF features, 
fi, i ∈ {mn,mx,… , se} , once extracted from FOF features, 
should be organised into the form of a SOF feature vector, 
i.e. vT
SOF
=
[
fmn, fmx,… , fse
]
 , where T  indicates a particular 
type of FOF feature. When all the SOF feature vectors are 
formed for a subject, a cumulative SOF feature vector, VSOF , 
can be generated. This is done by concatenating the SOF 
feature vectors, i.e. VSOF =
[
vDT
SOF
, vFT1
SOF
,… , vPS
SOF
]
 . Once both 
FOF and SOF cumulative feature vectors are formed for a 
subject, they should be combined into a form of a feature set, 
i.e. 휏 =
{
VFOF,VSOF
}
 . A feature set consists of the FOF and 
SOF features extracted from the raw touch dynamics data of 
a single input string of a subject.
5.2  Feature normalisation
If different features have different value ranges, the values 
of the features should be normalised. When features have 
different value ranges, they may have unbalanced weights at 
representing the structure of the data. Also, some algorithms 
Fig. 3  The different feature 
length values
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perform better and faster if the features have the same value 
range (Juszczak et al. 2002). For these reasons, the values 
of different features should be normalised to the same value 
range, this is usually done by using a process called feature 
normalisation.
In our experiments, we have conducted a feature nor-
malisation process, and in this process, we have used a 
method called the min–max normalisation (Jain et al. 2005). 
With this method, the values of the features are scaled so 
that their ranges are confined to a predefined lower and 
upper boundary. Let X denotes a dataset of feature sets, 
휏ij, i ∈ {1, 2,… a}, j ∈ {1, 2,… d} , represented in the form 
of an a − by − d matrix, where a refers the number of feature 
sets in the dataset and d refers to the feature dimensions of 
the feature sets. The matrix can be represented as:
Then, the normalised dataset X̂ is obtained by using the 
following equation:
5.3  Feature selection
Feature selection ensures an optimal set of features is used 
in training an authentication model to improve the accuracy 
performance of the model, while, at the same time, the cost 
incurred in training the model can be kept minimal. Typi-
cally, there are two sets of features, a preliminary feature set 
(PFS) and an optimal feature subset (OFS). PFS is a set of 
features that are directly extracted from raw touch dynamics 
data. OFS is a subset of features that are selected from the 
features in PFS. Feature selection involves two tasks, the 
selection of a feature selection method and the implementa-
tion of a feature selection process using the selected method.
We need a feature selection method that analyses the 
features in a PFS and selects an OFS from the PFS that 
satisfies two criteria. First, the OFS should contain the most 
relevant features. Second, the OFS should contain the least 
number of redundant features. In other words, the features 
in the OFS should have maximum relevance to the target 
variable (in our work, this is the identity of the subject, b ), 
and, at the same time, have minimum redundancy amongst 
the features in the subset. In this work, we have chosen to use 
the minimum-redundancy-maximum-relevance (mRMR) 
method (Peng et al. 2005) as our feature selection method, 
as this method quantifies how well a feature, fi , satisfies the 
two criteria mentioned above, and this is done by using a 
scoring metric,G . This metric is defined as:
X =
휏11 … 휏1d
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
휏a1 … 휏ad
X̂ =
Xij − min
(
Xj
)
max
(
Xj
)
− min
(
Xj
) × (u − l) + l
where the first part of the equation measures the degree of 
relevance between fi and b , and the second part measures 
the degree of redundancy between fi and the other features 
in the PFS, F . The higher the value of G , the better fi is at 
satisfying both criteria.
With regard to the second task, the feature selection pro-
cess is based on the mRMR method described above. The 
mRMR method is implemented by using the FEAST toolbox 
(version 1.1.4) (Brown et al. 2012). The process consists of 
the following four steps:
Step 1: The feature values in the PFS are converted to 
discrete values using the histogram bin counts method 
(MathWorks 2016).
Step 2: Starting with the first feature, G is calculated and 
assigned to the feature. This step is repeated for each of 
the remaining features in the PFS.
Step 3: Based on G , the features are sorted into a list. The 
features with higher scores are ranked higher in the list.
Step 4: Finally, the features ranked at the top-z % in the 
list are selected as the OFS, where z refers to the feature 
selection size.
In our study carried out to examine the effects of feature 
selection sizes on the accuracy performance, we have used 
different feature selection sizes. However, in our other stud-
ies, we used a feature selection size of 20.
6  Model training unit (MTU)
MTU analyses the touch dynamics feature sets (also referred 
to as touch dynamics samples or samples) extracted by FCU 
and trains them to generate an authentication model. The 
generated model should uniquely represent the correspond-
ing subject’s touch dynamics pattern. Model training is 
carried out by using a process called feature classification. 
The input of this process is the extracted OFS features, the 
algorithm used is a classifier, and the output is an authenti-
cation model. Feature classification involves two tasks, the 
selection of classifier and the implementation of the selected 
classifier.
Depending on the data used, classifiers can be classified 
into two groups, one-class classifier (OCC) and two-class 
classifier (TCC). An OCC classifier only uses data from a 
single class (e.g. data from legitimate subject). Unlike an 
OCC classifier, a TCC classifier uses data from two classes 
(e.g. data from both legitimate and illegitimate subjects). 
In the mobile device context, obtaining two classes of data 
G
�
fi
�
= MI
�
fi, b
�
−
∑
j∈F MI
�
fi, fj
�
�F�
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with a similar size is not practical. This is due to the fact 
that a mobile device is rarely shared among multiple users. 
Also, sharing a passcode with others increases data privacy 
risks and is not a recommended practice. For these reasons, 
obtaining illegitimate subject data is not practical, and only 
the data from the legitimate subject are available for use to 
train the classifier. If this is the case, a TCC classifier may 
not perform well, as it requires data from two classes to 
train a model that separates the two classes apart (Bellinger 
et al. 2012). By contrast, an OCC classifier only needs data 
from one class to train a model, so in this case, the model 
training is not affected by any imbalanced data. Besides, the 
time taken by a TCC classifier to train a model is longer than 
that by an OCC classifier, as the former uses more data in 
training the model. Based on these considerations, we have 
chosen to use OCC classifier for feature classifications.
With regard to the second task, we have implemented 
both OCC and TCC classifiers. For feature classifications, 
we have implemented two OCC classifiers: (i) one-class 
k-nearest neighbour (OCKNN) (Tax 2001), and (ii) the sup-
port vector data description (SVDD) (Tax and Duin 2004). 
For our comparative study, i.e. the study we have carried out 
to examine the effectiveness of using OCC classifiers versus 
using TCC classifiers, we have implemented two TCC clas-
sifiers as well: (i) k-nearest neighbour (KNN), and (ii) sup-
port vector machine (SVM) (Chang and Lin 2011). The clas-
sifiers used in our experiments are implemented using the 
Matlab (version 8.5.0.197613) programming platform and 
two open source toolboxes. The OCC and TCC classifiers 
are implemented using the dd_tools toolbox (Tax 2015) and 
the PRTools toolbox (Duin and Pekalska 2015), respectively. 
The implementation of the classifiers involves two phases: 
(i) the training (or enrolment) phase, and (ii) the testing (or 
verification) phase. In the training phase, training samples 
are used to train a classifier to build an authentication model. 
The built model is stored in DSU. In the testing phase, a test-
ing sample is compared against the stored model to generate 
a classification score. This score will then be used to make 
an authentication decision.
7  Authentication decision‑making unit 
(ADMU)
ADMU makes an authentication decision, i.e. whether a test-
ing sample matches with the authentication model of the 
owner of the device. The design of ADMU involves two pro-
cesses, feature matching and feature thresholding. In the fea-
ture matching process, the testing sample acquired from an 
authentication attempt is matched against the stored model 
in DSU to obtain a classification score. In the thresholding 
process, the score is compared to a predefined threshold, 
and if the score is over the threshold, then the sample is 
classified as legitimate. Otherwise, the sample classified as 
illegitimate.
8  Performance evaluation methodology
This section describes how the accuracy performance of our 
touch dynamics authentication method is evaluated. It covers 
the evaluation method, procedure and metrics used.
8.1  Evaluation method
To perform the accuracy performance evaluation of our 
touch dynamics authentication methods, we should per-
form the following four tasks. Firstly, we classify subjects 
into two sets, one designated as legitimate subjects and the 
other as illegitimate subjects. Secondly, some of the touch 
dynamics samples acquired from these subjects are used as 
training samples, in which these samples are used by MTU 
to generate authentication models. Thirdly, some of the other 
samples are used as testing samples, in which these sam-
ples and the generated models are used by ADMU to make 
authentication decisions. Lastly, based on the decisions, the 
evaluation metrics values are calculated, which indicates the 
accuracy performance of the model.
We need to acquire four sets of samples: (i) legitimate 
training set, (ii) legitimate testing set, (iii) illegitimate train-
ing set, and (iv) illegitimate testing set. To acquire the first 
two sets, we simply split the samples of each subject into 
two subsets, one as legitimate training set, and the other as 
legitimate testing set. To acquire the third set, we assign the 
samples of each subject that are not used as testing samples 
as the illegitimate training samples for all other subjects. To 
acquire the fourth set, we assign the samples of each subject 
that are not used as training samples as the illegitimate test-
ing samples for all other subjects.
Once all the four sets of samples are acquired, they are 
used to evaluate the accuracy performance of our touch 
dynamics authentication method. The samples in (i) and (iii) 
are used by MTU to train classifiers to generate authentica-
tion models. The samples in (ii) and (iv) and the generated 
models are used by ADMU to make authentication deci-
sions. The decisions are then compared against the actual 
classes of the testing samples to formulate a false acceptance 
count and a false rejection count. If a legitimate testing sam-
ple is incorrectly classified as illegitimate, the false rejec-
tion count is incremented. If an illegitimate testing sample 
is incorrectly classified as legitimate, the false acceptance 
count is incremented. These counts are used to calculate 
the evaluation metrics values described in the next section. 
The performance evaluation method described above is 
implemented using the evaluation procedure summarised 
in Algorithm 1. 
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and the FAR values on the x-axis. The closer the curve to 
the bottom left corner, the better the accuracy performance 
of the model.
9  Performance evaluation results 
and analysis
This section describes the experiments carried out to evalu-
ate the performance of the touch dynamics authentication 
method and discusses the evaluation results obtained. The 
results are presented in the following order, the evaluation 
of, RDAU (Sect. 9.1), FCU (Sect. 9.2), MTU (Sect. 9.3), and 
the authentication architecture as a whole (Sect. 9.4). The 
experiments were conducted using the evaluation method-
ology described in Sect. 8. Unless otherwise stated, each 
experiment was repeated four times, each time using one 
of the four classifiers (discussed in Sect. 6) in turn, and the 
results reported were the average of the classifiers.
9.1  Evaluation of RDAU
The evaluation of RDAU is carried out with different value 
settings for two parameters, i.e. the scaling factor and input 
string lengths.
8.2  Evaluation metrics
To evaluate the accuracy performance of the authentica-
tion model, three evaluation metrics are used, the False 
Rejection Rate (FRR), the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
and the Equal Error Rate (EER). FRR and FAR are also 
used to plot the Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curve 
(Martin et al. 1997), which is used to evaluate and com-
pare the accuracy performances of different models in a 
graphical representation form.
FRR is calculated as the ratio of the false rejection 
count and the total number of legitimate testing samples. 
FAR is calculated as the ratio of the false acceptance count 
and the total number of illegitimate testing samples. EER 
is a single-number accuracy performance metric, which 
is calculated by averaging the FRR and FAR values with 
the condition that the absolute value of the difference 
between FRR and FAR is minimal (Chen 2003). Typi-
cally, the lower the FRR and FAR values, the lower the 
EER value. A lower EER value indicates a better accuracy 
performance of the model.
To plot the DET curve of a model, a set of FRR and 
FAR values of the model is needed. The values are 
obtained by setting the threshold to different values. The 
curve is formed by plotting the FRR values on the y-axis 
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9.1.1  Scaling factor
The scaling factor is used to set the timestamps to different 
precision levels (as discussed in Sect. 4.4). To investigate the 
impact of using different scaling factor values, we have eval-
uated the accuracy performances, and the storage require-
ments of timing features by setting the scaling factor to be a 
range of values from 0 (no scaling) to 8 (maximum scaling) 
with an increment of 1. For each scaling factor value, we 
have extracted all the timing related FOF features from both 
the 4D string and the 16D string as the test cases.
Figure 4 shows the EER values versus different scaling 
factors, where two different input string lengths are consid-
ered. As can be seen from the figure, for both input string 
lengths, the EER values stay flat before a threshold value 
is reached. For the 4D string, this threshold value is 5, and 
for the 16D string, it is 6. Beyond the threshold values, the 
EER values increase steadily for the 4D string and sharply 
for the 16D string. These observations can be explained as 
follows. When timestamps are scaled using a smaller to a 
medium scaling factor, the timestamps have a proper preci-
sion to capture a human’s touch action speed. As a result, 
the timing features, extracted from the timestamps, con-
tain sufficient information to properly capture a human’s 
touch dynamics pattern, resulting in stable EER values as 
observed. However, when using a very large scaling factor 
(7 or 8), the timestamps becomes smaller, and the timing 
features extracted from the timestamps contain less infor-
mation, leading to an increase in the EER values. These 
observations indicate that, by scaling timestamps, the accu-
racy performance of the timing features extracted from the 
timestamps cannot be improved, but the use of an inadequate 
scaling factor value can worsen the accuracy performance.
It should also be emphasised that the use of different scal-
ing factor values may affect the amount of storage space 
required to store the timing features. To investigate this effect 
further, we have recorded and compared the storage spaces 
used by the timing features extracted from timestamps with 
different scaling factor values. The results showed that the 
larger the scaling factor value, the less the amount of storage 
space that is used to store the timing features, though the 
level of reduction is small. For example, when the scaling 
factor value is set to a value between 0 and 5, the storage 
space used is reduced from 0.217 KB to 0.110 KB, and the 
reduction is only 0.107 KB. This level of reduction can be 
regarded as negligible, especially considering the fact that 
recently released mobile devices typically have a storage 
capacity of at least 8 GB to 32 GB (Bao et al. 2010), and the 
capacity is expected to increase in newer generation devices 
(Miluzzo et al. 2012).
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that scaling 
timestamps does not bring much benefit. On the contrary, the 
scaling process introduces additional computational over-
head. We, therefore, do not scale timestamps in our design. 
For some applications, for example, where the primary 
requirement is to minimise storage space, we recommend 
setting the scaling factor value to 5 (and not beyond).
9.1.2  Input string lengths
Using different input string lengths may also affect EER 
values. To examine the effect, we used two input strings 
with two different lengths, a 4D and a 16D string. For both 
input strings, FOF and SOF features were extracted. For 
each input string, we repeated the experiment four times, 
and for each time one of the four classifiers was used.
Figure 5 shows the EER values versus two input strings 
and four different classifiers. As shown in the figure, for 
all the classifiers, using the 16D string introduces a lower 
EER value, indicating that the longer the input string, the 
more accurate the authentication model. The reasons for 
Fig. 4  EER values versus different scaling factor values Fig. 5  EER values versus two different input string lengths and four classifiers
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this are threefold. Firstly, the length of the 16D string is 
four times longer than that of the 4D string, and so is the 
number of features that are extracted from the 16D string. 
More features means more information about a subject’s 
touch dynamics pattern can be captured, therefore a more 
accurate model can be built out of the features. Secondly, 
when the input string length increases, the number of 
possible chunk combinations also increases, and so is the 
ability to better capture a subject’s touch dynamics pat-
tern. Finally, when the input string length increases, the 
number of illegitimate features required to match that of a 
legitimate model will also increase, which means that the 
level of difficulty in impersonating a subject successfully 
also increases.
The above results have revealed a correlation between 
the input string length and security. The shorter the input 
string length, the lower the level of authentication accuracy, 
indicating a lower level of security. There is also a correla-
tion between the input string length and usability. The longer 
the input string, the more the number of touch actions are 
required to complete the input of the string, thus the harder 
and slower it is for the users to memorise the string, indicat-
ing a lower level of usability. A similar correlation has also 
been reported in (Huh et al. 2015). In summary, the input 
string length influences the trade-off between security and 
usability. Therefore, in real-life applications, it should be 
chosen based on the security and usability requirements of 
the apps.
9.2  Evaluation of FCU
This section evaluates FCU with different parameter value 
settings, i.e. FOF features, FOF feature combinations, SOF 
versus FOF features, timing feature lengths, and feature 
selection sizes.
9.2.1  FOF features
There are four types of FOF (as discussed in Sect. 5.1.1). 
Each type of FOF captures a subject’s touch dynamics pat-
tern in a different way. To investigate the accuracy perfor-
mance of the authentication method using different types of 
FOF, we have extracted all four types of FOF from the 4D 
string as the test case.
Figure 6 shows the EER values of the four types of FOF. 
The EER value of PS is the lowest amongst the four types, 
which means that the accuracy performance of PS is better 
than timing features. This result can be explained as follows. 
The PS values are determined by several factors such as: (i) 
the physical size of the fingertip used to perform a TAP; 
(ii) the amount of force exerted during a TAP; and (iii) the 
fingertip position or angle during a TAP. The combination 
of these factors creates a distinctive pattern, which allows PS 
to better capture each subject’s touch dynamics pattern, and, 
as a result, achieves a higher level of accuracy.
With regard to the timing features, FT achieves the best 
accuracy performance in comparison with IT and DT. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, FT has a significantly larger 
feature dimensional space than IT and DT, and, as a result, 
more features are available for use in building the model 
that could better capture the subject’s touch dynamics pat-
tern. Secondly, FT has more control information and more 
discriminative properties than IT and DT, which may have 
originated from two sources. The first is the information 
embedded within the natural short pauses between different 
chunks. The second is the variability of chunk combina-
tions. These can enable the classifiers to build models that 
better distinguish touch dynamics patterns from one subject 
to another. For these reasons, FT achieves a higher level of 
accuracy than DT.
A better way of understanding the accuracy perfor-
mances achieved by different types of FOF is to visualise 
the feature values from different subjects graphically. Fig-
ure 7 shows the feature scatter plots of three types of FOF 
from three subjects. The subjects are randomly chosen. The 
x- and y-axis of each figure represents a type of FOF with 
the feature ID given in brackets. What is striking about the 
plots shown in the figure is that when PS is used (shown in 
Fig. 7c), the three subjects can be clearly distinguished or 
separated. However, this is not the case for FT (shown in 
Fig. 7b) and DT (shown in Fig. 7a). These observations are 
consistent with our discussions given above, i.e. PS achieves 
the best accuracy performance, which is followed by FT and, 
then, by DT.
9.2.2  FOF feature combinations
The results in Sect. 9.2.1 have shown that some types of FOF 
perform better than others. However, this does not mean Fig. 6  EER values for different types of FOF
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that those under-performing types of FOF are not useful, as 
each type of FOF captures a different aspect of a subject’s 
touch dynamics pattern. To investigate whether the accuracy 
performance of a model could be improved by combining 
multiple types of FOF, we formed 15 different feature set 
combinations by using the four types of FOF, and grouped 
them into four categories, i.e. S1(4), S2(6), S3(4), and S4(1). 
The numbers inside the brackets each indicate the number 
of feature set combinations in each category. The category 
number represents the number of types of FOF in each fea-
ture set of the corresponding category. Take the S3(4) cat-
egory, for example, there are four feature set combinations, 
and each set is formed by using three types of FOF, i.e. 
{DT,FT,IT}, {DT,FT,PS}, {DT,IT,PS}, {FT,IT,PS}.
Figure 8 shows the EER values and the feature dimen-
sions for different feature sets. For each category, only 
the best-performing feature set is shown. As can be seen 
from the figure, the larger the category number, the lower 
the EER value. In other words, the more types of FOF are 
combined, the better the accuracy performance we may 
achieve. For example, when S1 is used, the EER value is 
the highest (18.8%). However, when S2 is used, the EER 
value decreases to 12.55%, which is a marked drop, and 
when S3 and S4 are used, the EER value drops to 11.50 and 
11.45%, respectively. These results can be explained as fol-
lows. When more types of FOF are combined, more features 
Fig. 7  Feature scatter plots of the three types of FOF: a DT, b FT, and c PS
Fig. 8  EER values and feature dimensions for different feature sets
Fig. 9  EER values for different feature sets (with the feature dimen-
sions in brackets)
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are used in building the model, thus a more accurate model 
can be produced. However, the accuracy performance gain 
between the feature set S3 and feature set S4 is very small 
(only 0.5%). An explanation for this is that the features in 
S3 and S4 are very similar. The only difference is that S4 
contains one additional feature, IT, which means that the 
features in S4 only capture a small amount of additional 
information in comparison with the features in S3, so there 
is only a minor improvement in the accuracy performance.
In summary, these experimental results suggest that 
the accuracy performance of the model can be improved 
by combining different types of FOF, and the combination 
of low-/medium-performing types of FOF can achieve a 
higher level of accuracy than the best-performing type of 
FOF when used individually.
9.2.3  SOF versus FOF features
SOF features are extracted from FOF features. To study the 
effectiveness of the SOF features, we have used three cat-
egories of features: (i) C1, containing the FOF features; (ii) 
C2, containing the SOF features that are extracted from the 
features in C1; and (iii) C3, containing the features in C1 and 
C2. Each category consists of three feature sets formed by 
using DT, FT, and PS, respectively. The features in the sets 
are extracted from the 16D string.
Figure 9 shows the EER values of the feature sets of three 
different categories. From the figure, we can see that, with 
the exception of C2 for FT, the EER values of C2 are higher 
than those of C1 in both cases of DT and PS. This may be 
due to that, as discussed in Sect. 5.1.2, the SOF features are 
descriptive statistics metrics, the fewer values available for 
use to generate the metrics, the less meaningful the metrics 
are at representing the trends of the values, and, as a result, 
achieves a lower level of accuracy. However, in the case of 
FT, the feature has a larger feature dimensional space than 
its counterparts, DT and PS, so more feature values are avail-
able when it is used to extract C2 (the SOF features) values. 
Therefore, we can get a better accuracy performance.
Based on the results, it seems that the accuracy perfor-
mance of the authentication method with the use of C2 is not 
as good as that of C1, but this does not mean that they are 
not useful. C2 represents a subject’s touch dynamics pattern 
in a different way from that of C1, and by combining the 
features in C1 and C2, the number of features available for 
use in training the model increases. As a result, the model 
has a better accuracy performance, meaning that the model 
could better capture the subject’s touch dynamics pattern. 
For example, the EER value of C3 for DT (20.4%) is lower 
than the corresponding values of both C1 (22.28%) and C2 
(26.75%). This is also true in the case of C3 for FT and for 
PS.
9.2.4  Timing feature lengths
FT features can be extracted at different feature lengths. 
To study the correlation between the feature length and 
the accuracy performance, we set the values of the feature 
length to be a range of values from 2-graph to n-graph. The 
minimum and maximum value of the range respectively 
corresponds to the shortest and longest possible feature 
length used to extract FT features. In this test case, we have 
extracted the FT features from the 4D string.
Figure 10 shows the EER values and feature dimen-
sions versus different values of the feature length. From 
the figure, it can be seen that there is a steady increase in 
the EER values as the value of the feature length increases. 
When the feature length is set to 2-graph, the EER value 
is the lowest at 21.28%. As the value of the feature length 
Fig. 10  EER values of FT versus different feature length values for 
the 4D string
Fig. 11  EER values and feature dimensions versus the OFS sets at 
different feature selection sizes
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increases, the EER value increases steadily, and when the 
feature length is set to 5-graph, the EER value reaches to the 
highest at 32.20%. These results indicate that the accuracy 
performance worsens when a longer feature length value 
is used. This could be due to the reason that timing fea-
tures expressed using a longer feature length value contain 
a lower level of granularity, and thus capturing less informa-
tion about a subject’s touch dynamics pattern, leading to a 
lower level of accuracy. These results reflect those reported 
in (Giuffrida et al. 2014) where the authors also found that 
the accuracy performances of the features extracted with 
a shorter feature length are better than those with a longer 
feature length.
9.2.5  Feature selection sizes
In a feature selection process, the most important set of fea-
tures are selected from a feature set, PFS, to form a subset of 
features, OFS, that could better represent the structure of the 
data. To investigate the benefit of using feature selection, we 
have used 13 different sets of OFS and compared their EER 
values. To form these sets of OFS, we first formed a PFS set 
consisted of the FOF and SOF features extracted from the 
16D string. Then, we applied a feature selection process to 
the PFS set using 13 different feature selection sizes.
Figure 11 shows the EER values and feature dimensions 
versus the OFS sets with different feature selection sizes. 
As can be seen from the figure, the EER values are higher 
when the size is set to a very small or very large value. The 
EER values decrease sharply as the sizes increase from 1% 
to approximately 10%, remain mostly unchanged from 10 to 
30%, before increasing slightly as the sizes increase toward 
100%. These results can be explained as follows. When the 
smallest size (1%) is used, the OFS set has only 2 (out of 
231) features. With such a small number of features avail-
able for training the model, the model does not have suf-
ficient information to properly represent a subject’s touch 
dynamics pattern, and, as a result, achieves the lowest level 
of accuracy (EER 17.05%). When larger sizes are used, the 
OFS sets have more features, and with more features avail-
able for training the model, the model could better represent 
a subject’s touch dynamics pattern, and, as a result, the EER 
values decrease sharply. At a certain feature selection size, 
the EER value reverses the downward trend and starts gradu-
ally increase as the size increases further towards 100%. This 
change in trend usually happens when the feature dimension 
is relatively large, larger than the training sample size, such 
that the ability of the classifier to build an accurate model 
is reduced because of the large set of features (Gheyas and 
Smith 2010).
With the exception of the feature selection size of 1 and 
2%, the accuracy performances for the other sizes are better 
than that of 100% (which is the case without feature selec-
tion or the use of the PFS set). This observation implies that, 
as long as the feature selection size is not set to an extremely 
low value, applying feature selection to the PFS set can 
improve the accuracy performance, and reduce the feature 
dimension of the PFS set, which leads to an increase in the 
efficiency and the robustness of the authentication method.
9.3  Evaluation of MTU
The classifiers used in our experiments can be classified into 
two groups, OCC and TCC. The main difference between the 
two groups lies in the type of training samples they each use 
in building authentication models (as discussed in Sect. 6). 
Because of this, the models built by the two groups of clas-
sifiers differ in three attributes: (i) the accuracy performance, 
(ii) the training time, and (iii) the testing time. To evaluate 
and compare the two groups of classifiers in terms of these 
three attributes, we have chosen two classifiers for each 
group. For the OCC group, we have chosen OCKNN and 
Table 3  EER, training, and testing time values of four classifiers
Classifiers Classifier groups EER (%) Training 
times (unit)
Testing 
times 
(unit)
OCKNN OCC 10.5 1 1
KNN TCC 8.7 1 7
SVDD OCC 9.9 3 1
SVM TCC 9.4 22 2
Fig. 12  DET curves of four different classifiers
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SVDD, and, for the TCC group, we have chosen KNN and 
SVM. The input to each of these classifiers is set to be the 
OFS set (with the feature selection size set to 20%) extracted 
from the 4D string.
Table 3 shows the EER values, training times, and testing 
times produced by using the classifiers, and Fig. 12 presents 
the DET curves of the classifiers. As shown in the table 
the EER values produced when using OCC are higher than 
those when using TCC. More specifically, the EER values 
when using OCKNN and SVDD are 10.5 and 9.9%, respec-
tively, whereas the corresponding values when using KNN 
and SVM are, respectively, 8.7 and 9.4%. This indicates that 
the accuracy performances of the models built by OCC are 
lower than those by TCC. This may be due to the fact that, 
unlike OCC, the classifiers in TCC build the models with 
both legitimate and illegitimate samples, which means that 
the models can capture more information about the subjects’ 
touch dynamics patterns, leading to more accurate models. 
However, it should be emphasised that the level of gain in 
the accuracy performance by using TCC is not significant. 
As shown in Fig. 12, the DET curves of OCC and TCC are 
somewhat close to each other.
Unlike the case for the accuracy performance, there is no 
clear correlation between a particular group of classifiers, 
OCC or TCC, and the model training time, rather the model 
training time appears to be classifier dependent. Among 
the four classifiers, SVM is significantly more expensive 
than the other three classifiers. The second most expensive 
classifier is SVDD, consuming 3 units of time against 1 by 
OCKNN and KNN. Two factors influence the model training 
time: (i) the nature (structure or approach) of a classifier, and 
(ii) the number of samples a classifier uses to train a model. 
It seems that the first factor plays a dominant role in model 
training time.
With regards to the model testing time, TCC classifiers 
are more expensive than OCC classifiers. KNN is the most 
expensive one among the four classifiers; seven times more 
expensive than OCKNN and SVDD. SVM is second most 
expensive, costing twice as much as OCKNN and SVDD. 
Similar to the case for the model training time, it seems that 
the nature of a classifier plays a dominant role in model 
testing time.
Based on the above results and discussions, particularly 
taking into consideration of the finding that, for a roughly 
similar level of accuracy performance, OCC classifiers are 
generally more efficient than TCC classifiers, both in terms 
of model training and testing times, and that, in a mobile 
device context, usually only the data from the owner of a 
device are available for use in training the classifier to build 
the authentication model, and performance and usability 
requirements are also important, we recommend the use of 
OCC classifiers in building an authentication model in this 
application context.
9.4  Evaluation of the authentication architecture
One potential application area of touch dynamics biomet-
rics is user-to-mobile device authentication. For example, 
we could integrate a touch dynamics biometrics-based 
authentication method into an existing knowledge-based 
authentication method (e.g. a PIN) to produce a so-called 
two-factor authentication system. In this two-factor authen-
tication system, the PIN serves one factor, and the touch 
dynamics serves the other factor. To evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of this two-factor authentication method, 
we have compared two authentication systems: one using 
only a 4-digit PIN (denote as AS1), and the other using both 
a 4-digit PIN and the touch dynamics (denote as AS2).
In the evaluation, for both AS1 and AS2, we have used 
the assumption that the PIN has already been exposed to 
an impersonator. In this case, with AS1, the probability for 
the impersonator to successfully gain access to the user’s 
device is 100%. On the contrary, with AS2, this probability 
is reduced to 9.9%, which is a significant reduction, indicat-
ing that the two-factor authentication method can achieve a 
significantly higher level of security in comparison with the 
single-factor method. Of course, there is a price to pay for 
using AS2; there is a non-zero FRR, which impedes usabil-
ity. With this level of security enhancement offered by AS2, 
1 out of 10 legitimate login attempts may be incorrectly 
rejected. With AS1, the FRR is zero, as none of the login 
attempts will be falsely rejected as long as the PIN is entered 
correctly.
The above evaluation results show that, with an addi-
tional authentication factor provided by using the touch 
dynamics biometrics, unauthorised accesses to mobile 
devices become harder, thus strengthening the security 
level of mobile devices. The results also show that, with 
the use of a touch dynamics based authentication method, 
there is a trade-off between security and usability. We leave 
the research question as for how to balance this trade-off to 
future investigation.
10  Conclusion and future work
This paper has investigated the feasibility and effectiveness 
of using touch dynamics biometrics for user authentication 
on mobile devices. To evaluate the effectiveness of this 
authentication method, we have acquired a comprehensive 
touch dynamics dataset. The method and process used to 
acquire this dataset have been clearly described and dis-
cussed. The paper has also extensively discussed how raw 
touch dynamics data may be extracted from the dataset, and 
how the raw data is processed into a proper format for fea-
ture extraction. In particular, it has explained that two types 
of features can be extracted, a basic set of features, FOF, that 
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can be extracted from the raw data, and an extended set of 
features, SOF, that can be extracted from FOF features. The 
paper then describes how the features may be analysed to 
select a subset of optimal features, and how the features may 
be classified using classifiers to build authentication models. 
Our experimental results show that the use of OCC classi-
fiers is more efficient for roughly the same level of security 
than TCC classifiers, making the OCC-based classification 
method more practical in real-world applications.
Experiments were carried out to evaluate the performance 
of the touch dynamics authentication under various param-
eter settings. Experimental results showed that by integrat-
ing the touch dynamics authentication method into a 4-digit 
PIN-based authentication method, the success rate of an 
impersonation attempt is drastically reduced from 100% (if 
only the PIN is used) to 9.9% (if both the PIN and the touch 
dynamics are used). These results indicate that the idea of 
using touch dynamics biometrics to support user authenti-
cation in a mobile device or application context is feasible.
With regard to future work, we have identified the follow-
ing issues that require further study. The first is to further 
investigate the scalability and viability of the touch dynam-
ics authentication method by investigating the energy con-
sumption and computational overhead introduced by the 
method on devices equipped with different battery capacity, 
CPU clock speed, and storage capacity, etc.
The second is to investigate whether there are additional 
features that could be captured to represent a subject’s touch 
dynamics pattern. One way of doing this is by represent-
ing features in a different form, for example, by plotting the 
feature values in a graph, and then use the graph in the form 
of an image as the features to build authentication models. 
Alternatively, instead of searching for features manually, we 
could automate this process by using state-of-the-art deep 
learning techniques. These techniques have been widely 
used in the field of computer vision to automatically extract 
representative features from image related data (LeCun et al. 
2010; Xu et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2014). Perhaps they can 
also be used to automatically find, from raw touch dynamics 
data, representative features to build accurate authentication 
models.
Thirdly, touch dynamics patterns can be affected by 
behavioural changes over time. These changes may cause 
trained model to deviate from the subject’s most recent 
touch dynamics pattern. If this is the case, the accuracy 
performance of the model is reduced. In this regard, future 
research is necessary to explore how and to what extent these 
changes affect the accuracy performance, and what method 
may be used to accommodate these changes effectively.
Lastly, our dataset could be better with the use of data 
from more sensor modalities. We are working on using 
more recent device to capitalise on the wide range of avail-
able sensors such as orientation, inertial, accelerometer and 
gyroscope to collect a more comprehensive dataset. In addi-
tion, we aim to collect more samples from each subject so 
that there are sufficient samples for us to use more advanced 
algorithms, such as deep belief networks (Deng and Zhong 
2013), to classify subject’s touch dynamics pattern in an 
effective manner.
Data availability The dataset used to support the findings of this study 
is available to download at https ://goo.gl/sNACU 8.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest The authors declare that there is no conflict of in-
terest regarding the publication of this article.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
References
Amin R, Gaber T, ElTaweel G (2015) Implicit authentication system 
for smartphones users based on touch data. In: Abraham A, Jiang 
XH, Snášel V, Pan J-S (eds) Intelligent data analysis and applica-
tions. Springer International Publishing, Berlin, pp 251–262. https 
://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21206 -7_22
Android developers (2017a) nanoTime—system. https ://devel oper.
andro id.com/refer ence/java/lang/Syste m.html#nanoT ime. 
Accessed 10 Dec 2017
Android developers (2017b) getSize—motionevent. https ://
devel oper.andro id.com/refer ence/andro id/view/Motio nEven 
t.html#getSi ze(int). Accessed 10 Dec 2017
Antal M, Nemes L (2016) The MOBIKEY Keystroke Dynamics 
Password Database: Benchmark Results. In: Silhavy R, Sen-
kerik R, Oplatkova ZK, Silhavy P, Prokopova Z (eds) software 
engineering perspectives and application in intelligent systems. 
Springer, Berlin, pp 35–46. https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
33622 -0_4
Aviv AJ, Gibson K, Mossop E, Blaze M, Smith JM. (2010). Smudge 
attacks on smartphone touch screens. In: Proceedings of the 4th 
USENIX conference on offensive technologies (pp 1–7). Berke-
ley, CA, USA: USENIX association. http://dl.acm.org/citat ion.
cfm?id=19250 04.19250 09. Accessed 16 July 2015
Aviv AJ, Sapp B, Blaze M, Smith JM (2012) Practicality of acceler-
ometer side channels on smartphones. In: Proceedings of the 28th 
annual computer security applications conference (pp 41–50). 
New York, NY, USA: ACM. https ://doi.org/10.1145/24209 
50.24209 57
 P. S. Teh et al.
1 3
Aviv AJ, Davin JT, Wolf F, Kuber R (2017) Towards base-
lines for shoulder surfing on mobile authentication. CoRR, 
abs/1709.04959. http://arxiv .org/abs/1709.04959 
Bao X, Lee U, Rimac I, Choudhury RR (2010) DataSpotting: offload-
ing cellular traffic via managed device-to-device data transfer at 
data spots. SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput Commun Rev. 14(3):37–
39. https ://doi.org/10.1145/19236 41.19236 55
Bellinger C, Sharma S, Japkowicz N (2012) One-class versus binary 
classification: which and when? In: 2012 11th international con-
ference on machine learning and applications (ICMLA) (Vol 2, 
pp 102–106). Presented at the 2012 11th international confer-
ence on machine learning and applications (ICMLA). https ://doi.
org/10.1109/ICMLA .2012.212
Ben Taylor (2014, July 21) Why smartphone screens are getting big-
ger: Specs reveal a surprising story. http://www.pcwor ld.com/artic 
le/24551 69/why-smart phone -scree ns-are-getti ng-bigge r-specs 
-revea l-a-surpr ising -story .html. Accessed 16 Feb 2016
Brown G, Pocock A, Zhao M-J, Luján M (2012) Conditional likelihood 
maximisation: a unifying framework for information theoretic fea-
ture selection. J Mach Learn Res. 13(1):27–66
Buriro Attaullah, Crispo B, Frari FD, Wrona K (2015) Touchstroke: 
smartphone user authentication based on touch-typing biometrics. 
In: Murino V, Puppo E, Sona D, Cristani M, Sansone C (eds), 
new trends in image analysis and processing—ICIAP 2015 work-
shops (pp 27–34). Springer International Publishing. http://link.
sprin ger.com/chapt er/10.1007/978-3-319-23222 -5_4. Accessed 
25 August 2015
Buriro A, Gupta S, Crispo B (2017) Evaluation of motion-based touch-
typing biometrics for online banking. In: 2017 international con-
ference of the biometrics special interest group (BIOSIG) (pp 
1–5). Presented at the 2017 international conference of the biom-
etrics special interest group (BIOSIG). https ://doi.org/10.23919 /
BIOSI G.2017.80535 04
Buschek D, De Luca A, Alt F (2015) Improving accuracy, applicabil-
ity and usability of keystroke biometrics on mobile touchscreen 
devices. In proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference on 
human factors in computing systems
Chang C-C, Lin C-J (2011) LIBSVM a library for sup-
port vector machines. ACM Trans Intell Syst Technol 
10(1145/1961189):1961199
Chang T-Y, Tsai C-J, Tsai W-J, Peng C-C, Wu H-S (2015) A change-
able personal identification number-based keystroke dynamics 
authentication system on smart phones. Secur Commun Networ, 
n/a-n/a. https ://doi.org/10.1002/sec.1265
Chen K (2003) Towards better making a decision in speaker verifi-
cation. Pattern Recogn 36(2):329–346. https ://doi.org/10.1016/
S0031 -3203(02)00034 -1
Coakley Michael J, Monaco JV, Tappert CC (2015) Numeric-passcode 
keystroke biometric studies on smartphones. In: Proceedings of 
student-faculty research day (p B4.1-B4.6). Presented at the pro-
ceedings of student-faculty research day, Pace University. http://
csis.pace.edu/~ctapp ert/srd20 15/2015P DF/b4.pdf
Coakley MJ, Monaco JV, Tappert CC (2016) Keystroke biometric stud-
ies with short numeric input on smartphones. In: 2016 IEEE 8th 
international conference on biometrics theory, applications and 
systems (BTAS) (pp 1–6). presented at the 2016 IEEE 8th interna-
tional conference on biometrics theory, applications and systems 
(BTAS). https ://doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2016.77911 81
De Luca A, Hang A, Brudy F, Lindner C, Hussmann H (2012) Touch 
me once and i know it’s you!: implicit authentication based on 
touch screen patterns. In: proceedings of the SIGCHI conference 
on human factors in computing systems (pp 987–996). New York, 
NY, USA: ACM. https ://doi.org/10.1145/22076 76.22085 44
Mendizabal-Vazquez I de, de Santos-Sierra D, Guerra-Casanova 
J, Sanchez-Avila C (2014) Supervised classification methods 
applied to keystroke dynamics through mobile devices. In: 2014 
international carnahan conference on security technology (ICCST) 
(pp 1–6). Presented at the 2014 international carnahan confer-
ence on security technology (ICCST). https ://doi.org/10.1109/
CCST.2014.69870 33
Deng Y, Zhong Y (2013a) Keystroke dynamics user authentication 
based on gaussian mixture model and deep belief nets. Research 
article, International scholarly research notices. https ://doi.
org/10.1155/2013/56518 3
Deng Y, Zhong Y (2013b) Keystroke dynamics user authentication 
based on gaussian mixture model and deep belief nets. Int Sch 
Res Notices. https ://doi.org/10.1155/2013/56518 3
Duin RPW, Pekalska E (2015) PRTools 5.3.1, A Matlab Toolbox for 
Pattern Recognition
El-Abed M, Dafer M, El Khayat, R (2014) RHU Keystroke: A mobile-
based benchmark for keystroke dynamics systems. In: 2014 inter-
national carnahan conference on security technology (ICCST) 
(pp 1–4). Presented at the 2014 international carnahan confer-
ence on security technology (ICCST). https ://doi.org/10.1109/
CCST.2014.69869 84
Gheyas IA, Smith LS (2010) Feature subset selection in large dimen-
sionality domains. Pattern Recogn 43(1):5–13. https ://doi.
org/10.1016/j.patco g.2009.06.009
Giuffrida C, Majdanik K, Conti M, Bos H (2014) I sensed it was you: 
authenticating mobile users with sensor-enhanced keystroke 
dynamics. In: S Dietrich (Ed.), detection of intrusions and mal-
ware, and vulnerability assessment (pp 92–111). springer interna-
tional publishing. http://link.sprin ger.com/chapt er/10.1007/978-3-
319-08509 -8_6. Accessed 4 February 2015
Ho TK (1998) Nearest neighbors in random subspaces. In: Amin A, 
Dori D, Pudil P, Freeman H (eds) Advances in pattern recogni-
tion. Springer, Berlin, pp 640–648. https ://doi.org/10.1007/BFb00 
33288 
Ho G (2013) TapDynamics: strengthening user authentication on 
mobile phones with keystroke dynamics. Stanford Univer-
sity. http://cs229 .stanf ord.edu/proj2 013/Ho-TapDy namic s.pdf. 
Accessed 18 June 2016
Huh JH, Kim H, Bobba RB, Bashir MN, Beznosov K (2015) On the 
memorability of system-generated PINs: can chunking help? In: 
eleventh symposium on usable privacy and security (SOUPS 
2015) (pp 197–209). Ottawa: USENIX association. https ://www.
useni x.org/confe rence /soups 2015/proce eding s/prese ntati on/huh. 
Accessed 12 Mar 2017
Jain A, Nandakumar K, Ross A (2005) Score normalization in mul-
timodal biometric systems. Pattern Recogn 38(12):2270–2285. 
https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.patco g.2005.01.012
Jain L, Monaco JV, Coakley MJ, Tappert CC (2014) Passcode key-
stroke biometric performance on smartphone touchscreens is 
superior to that on hardware keyboards. Inte J Res Comput Appl 
Inf Technol 2(4):29–33
Juszczak P, Tax D, Duin B (2002) Feature scaling in support vector 
data description. In: Proceedings ASCI (pp 95–102). Presented 
at the Conference. of the advanced school for computing and 
imaging
Krombholz K, Hupperich T, Holz T (2016) Use the force: evaluat-
ing force-sensitive authentication for mobile devices. In: Twelfth 
symposium on usable privacy and security (SOUPS 2016) (pp 
207–219). Denver, CO: USENIX Association. https ://www.useni 
x.org/confe rence /soups 2016/techn ical-sessi ons/prese ntati on/
kromb holz. Accessed 22 July 2017
LeCun Y, Kavukcuoglu K, Farabet C (2010) Convolutional networks 
and applications in vision. In: Proceedings of 2010 IEEE inter-
national symposium on circuits and systems (pp 253–256). 
Presented at the proceedings of 2010 IEEE international sym-
posium on circuits and systems. https ://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS 
.2010.55379 07
Strengthen user authentication on mobile devices by using user’s touch dynamics pattern 
1 3
Lee S-H, Roh J-H, Kim S, Jin S-H (2016) A study on feature of key-
stroke dynamics for improving accuracy in mobile environment. 
In: Information security applications (pp 366–375). Presented at 
the international workshop on information security applications, 
Springer, Cham. https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549 -1_31
Li Y, Yang J, Xie M, Carlson D, Jang HG, Bian J (2015) Comparison 
of PIN- and pattern-based behavioral biometric authentication on 
mobile devices. In: MILCOM 2015–2015 IEEE Military commu-
nications conference (pp 1317–1322). Presented at the MILCOM 
2015 –2015 IEEE military communications conference. https ://
doi.org/10.1109/MILCO M.2015.73576 27
Martin A, Doddington G, Kamm T, Ordowski M, Przybocki M (1997) 
The DET curve in assessment of detection task performance. 
National Inst Of Standards And Technology Gaithersburg Md. 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citat ions/ADA53 0509. Accessed 11 
Dec 2016
MathWorks (2016) Histogram bin counts—MATLAB histcounts. https 
://uk.mathw orks.com/help/matla b/ref/histc ounts .html?reque stedD 
omain =www.mathw orks.com. Accessed 11 Dec 2016
Miluzzo E, Cáceres R, Chen Y-F (2012) Vision: MClouds—computing 
on clouds of mobile devices. In: Proceedings of the third ACM 
workshop on mobile cloud computing and services (pp 9–14). 
New York, NY, USA: ACM. https ://doi.org/10.1145/23078 
49.23078 54
Owusu E, Han J, Das S, Perrig A, Zhang J (2012) ACCessory: pass-
word inference using accelerometers on smartphones. In: proceed-
ings of the twelfth workshop on mobile computing systems & 
applications (pp 9:1–9:6). New York, NY, USA: ACM. https ://
doi.org/10.1145/21620 81.21620 95
Park YH, Tien DN, Lee HC, Park KR, Lee EC, Kim SM, Kim HC 
(2011) A multimodal biometric recognition of touched fingerprint 
and finger-vein. In: 2011 international conference on multimedia 
and signal processing (Vol. 1, pp 247–250). Presented at the 2011 
international conference on multimedia and signal processing. 
https ://doi.org/10.1109/CMSP.2011.57
Peng H, Long F, Ding C (2005) Feature selection based on mutual 
information: criteria of max-dependency, max-relevance, and min-
redundancy. IEEE Trans Pattern Anal Mach Intell 27(8):1226–
1238. https ://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI .2005.159
Pham XL, Nguyen TH, Chen GD (2017) Factors that impact quiz score: 
a study with participants in a mobile learning app. In: 2017 IEEE 
17th international conference on advanced learning technologies 
(ICALT) (pp 103–105). Presented at the 2017 IEEE 17th inter-
national conference on advanced learning technologies (ICALT). 
https ://doi.org/10.1109/ICALT .2017.81
Praher C, Sonntag M (2016) Applicability of keystroke dynamics as 
a biometric security feature for mobile touchscreen devices with 
virtualised keyboards. Int J Inf Comput Secur 8(1):72–91. https 
://doi.org/10.1504/IJICS .2016.07531 1
Prem SM (2016) Introductory statistics, 9th edn. Wiley, New York
Roh JH Lee SH, Kim S. (2016). Keystroke dynamics for authentication 
in smartphone. In: 2016 International Conference on Information 
and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC) (pp 1155–
1159). Presented at the 2016 International Conference on Informa-
tion and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC). https 
://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC.2016.77633 94
Sen S, Muralidharan K (2014) Putting “pressure” on mobile authentica-
tion. In: 2014 seventh International Conference on mobile com-
puting and ubiquitous networking (ICMU) (pp 56–61). Presented 
at the 2014 Seventh International Conference on Mobile Comput-
ing and Ubiquitous Networking (ICMU). https ://doi.org/10.1109/
ICMU.2014.67990 58
Shen C, Yu T, Yuan S, Li Y, Guan X (2016) Performance analysis of 
motion-sensor behavior for user authentication on smartphones. 
Sensors 16(3):345. https ://doi.org/10.3390/s1603 0345
Stanciu V-D, Spolaor R, Conti M, Giuffrida C (2016) On the effective-
ness of sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics against statistical 
attacks. In: proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on data and 
application security and privacy (pp 105–112). New York, NY, 
USA: ACM. https ://doi.org/10.1145/28577 05.28577 48
Sun Y, Chen Y, Wang X, Tang X (2014) Deep learning face representa-
tion by joint identification-verification. In: Proceedings of the 27th 
international conference on neural information processing sys-
tems—vol 2 (pp 1988–1996). Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. 
http://dl.acm.org/citat ion.cfm?id=29690 33.29690 49. Accessed 
22 November 2017
Tasia C-J, Chang T-Y, Cheng P-C, Lin J-H (2014) Two novel biometric 
features in keystroke dynamics authentication systems for touch 
screen devices. Secur Commun Netw 7(4):750–758. https ://doi.
org/10.1002/sec.776
Tax DMJ (2001) One-class classification (Ph.D. thesis). Delft Uni-
versity of Technology. Retrieved from http://homep age.tudel ft.nl/
n9d04 /thesi s.pdf. Accessed 25 Apr 2016
Tax DMJ (2015) DDtools 2.1.2, the data description toolbox for matlab
Tax DMJ, Duin RPW (2004) Support vector data description. Mach 
Learn 54(1):45–66. https ://doi.org/10.1023/B:MACH.00000 
08084 .60811 .49
Teh PS, Zhang N, Teoh ABJ, Chen K (2016a) A survey on touch 
dynamics authentication in mobile devices. Comput Secur 
59:210–235. https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2016.03.003
Teh PS, Zhang N, Teoh ABJ, Chen K (2016b) TDAS: a touch dynam-
ics based multi-factor authentication solution for mobile devices. 
Int J Pervasive Comput Commun 12(1):127–153. https ://doi.
org/10.1108/IJPCC -01-2016-0005
Trojahn M, Arndt F, Ortmeier F (2013) Authentication with Keystroke 
dynamics on touchscreen keypads—effect of different N-graph 
combinations (pp 114–119). Presented at the MOBILITY 2013, 
The third international conference on mobile services, resources, 
and users. http://www.think mind.org/index .php?view=artic 
le&artic leid=mobil ity_2013_5_30_40071 . Accessed 17 Feb 2015
Wang J, Tang J, Xue G, Yang D (2017) Towards energy-efficient task 
scheduling on smartphones in mobile crowd sensing systems. 
Comput Netw 115:100–109. https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.comne 
t.2016.11.020
Wu J, Chen Z (2015) An implicit identity authentication system consid-
ering changes of gesture based on keystroke behaviors. Int J Dis-
trib Sens Netw 2015:e470274. https ://doi.org/10.1155/2015/47027 
4
Xu Y, Mo T, Feng Q, Zhong P, Lai, M, Chang EIC (2014) Deep learn-
ing of feature representation with multiple instance learning for 
medical image analysis. In 2014 IEEE International Conference 
on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) (pp 1626–
1630). Presented at the 2014 IEEE international conference on 
acoustics, speech and signal processing (ICASSP). https ://doi.
org/10.1109/ICASS P.2014.68538 73
Zakaria N H, Griffiths D, Brostoff S, Yan J (2011) Shoulder surfing 
defence for recall-based graphical passwords. In: Proceedings of 
the seventh symposium on usable privacy and security (pp 6:1–
6:12). New York, NY, USA: ACM. https ://doi.org/10.1145/20788 
27.20788 35
Zheng N, Bai K, Huang H, Wang H (2014) You are how you touch: 
user verification on smartphones via tapping behaviors. In: 2014 
IEEE 22nd international conference on network protocols (ICNP) 
(pp 221–232). PRESENTED at the 2014 IEEE 22nd international 
conference on network protocols (ICNP). https ://doi.org/10.1109/
ICNP.2014.43
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
